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11 Introduction
Urban sprawl is characterized by scattered and poorly planned low-density
development beyond the edge of urbanized areas. Over the past century, the
U.S. cities have expanded and density of land used per person has declined
drastically. Here are some facts:
• Nationwide, land consumed for building far outpaces population growth.
According to the American Farmland Trust, between 1960 and 1990, the
amount of developed land in metro areas more than doubled, while the pop-
ulation grew by less than half. For example, between 1970 and 1990, greater
Cleveland lost 11 percent of its population, yet developed land grew by 33
percent; greater Chicago gained 4 percent in population but 46 percent in res-
idential land; Los Angeles’ population grew by 45 percent while its developed
land increased by 300 percent.
• Census Bureau ﬁgures show that in 1920, the average density of urban-
ized areas (which includes cities, suburbs, and towns) was 6,160 persons per
square mile. In 1990, the number had diminished to 2,589.
Urban sprawl is a major concern across the U.S. cities. In general, ur-
ban sprawl has a variety of economic, social, and environmental consequences.
Sprawling development wastes resources by increasing public expenditures in
providing infrastructure and services. Urban sprawl increases travel time and
distance. Low-density development reduces the feasibility of mass transit,
thus increasing reliance on private automobile usage. This automobile ex-
cess increases pollution, congestion, alienation, and the use of scarce energy
resources. Sprawl also causes the excessive loss of farmland (for overviews
on urban sprawl issues, see Brueckner, 2000, Nechyba and Walsh, 2004, and
Glaeser and Kahn, 2004).
Needless to say, urban sprawl has more than one cause. The long-standing
debate on land taxation and its virtues (George, 1879; Skaburskis and Tomalty,
1997) reveals that property tax might be on the list of causes of urban sprawl.
Ap r o p e r t yt a xc a nb ev i e w e da sat a xl e v i e da te q u a lr a t e so nb o t ht h el a n d
and capital embodied in structures while, in a pure land tax, the tax on capital
(i.e., improvements) is set to zero. Abundant literature — for example, Arnott
and MacKinnon (1977), Case and Grant (1991), Oates and Schwab (1997),
Mills (1998), and Brueckner and Kim (2003) — provides arguments on how
property tax promotes ineﬃciently and under-used land development. The
standard result in this literature is that land is developed less intensively under
property taxation than under a pure land tax, leading to a spatial extension
of cities. The tax on improvements to land also raises the perceived cost of
2buildings and the owner can reduce the tax burden by designing projects that
use relatively more land in comparison to improvements. This leads to lower
than optimum densities and forces the city to spread more than it would had a
perfectly neutral tax has been used to ﬁnance local services and infrastructure.
In summary, the distortions generated by the property tax may have promoted
sprawling development patterns.
Despite ample discussion on property and urban sprawl, the net eﬀect of
property tax on spatial sizes of city is ambiguous from a closer examination on
previous theoretical models. Brueckner and Kim’s (2003) is the only theoretical
analysis that incorporates a land market to investigate the connection between
urban spatial expansion and the property tax.1 However in their full analysis,
the net eﬀect of property tax on spatial sizes of city is ambiguous. A literature
review further indicates that there has been no empirical study that carries out
a regression equation relating a city’s spatial size to a property tax measure
and other relevant variables.
The aim of this paper is to develop further the analysis on the net eﬀect of
property tax on the spatial size of cities and to test it using U.S. data.
We ﬁrst develop a theoretical model that investigates the property tax’s
eﬀects on urban sprawl. We take a log-linear utility function, which allows us
to have closed-form solutions and to show that, unambiguously, an increase in
property taxes reduces city size and thus urban sprawl. We are also able to
derive some cross-eﬀect results, namely the higher the commuting cost and the
smaller the city (in terms of population), the higher the negative eﬀect of the
property tax on urban sprawl. This shows, for example, that in bigger cities the
eﬀect of property taxes on urban sprawl is lower than in small cities. Using this
utility function, we then develop further the model by relaxing one of the key
assumptions in Brueckner and Kim (2003), the fact that landlords are absent
and live outside the city. This assumption, in particular, implies that the
rent generated by the land does not appear as income for the urban residents,
accruing instead to individuals living elsewhere. This limits the scope of a
general equilibrium analysis. We thus relax this assumption and consider a
model in which landlords are residents of the city. The model becomes more
complicated since landlords are now the city residents and thus new income
eﬀects are generated. In fact, as it is standard in a fulled closed city model,
the city residents are now assumed to form a government, which rents the land
for the city from rural landlords at the agricultural rent. The city government,
in turn, subleases the land to city residents at the competitive rent. Even in
1Arnott and MacKinnon (1977) is another exception but most of the analysis is solved
using numerical simulations.
3this more complicated model, we are able to demonstrate that an increase in
property taxes reduces urban sprawl, showing how robust is this result.
We then undertake an empirical analysis to test our main theoretical result,
namely the negative impact of property taxes on urban sprawl. To identify the
impact of property tax on city size, we use instrumental variables because of
the simultaneity problem between these two variables. We need an instrument
that predicts changes in property tax rates, but is unrelated to changes in city
size (after controlling for other relevant factors). An appropriate instrument
for the property tax rate is the magnitude of state aid to schools. In this
context, the impact of property tax on city size is estimated using two-stage
least squares (2SLS), treating the property tax variable as endogenous and the
other right-hand-side variables as exogenous. Our empirical results conﬁrm
the main prediction of the theoretical model: an increase in property taxes
reduces urban sprawl.
2T h e o r y
We now develop our theoretical model in order to examine the connection
between property tax and urban sprawl. For the sake of the presentation, we
ﬁrst expose the Brueckner and Kim (2003)’s model. Then, we develop their
model in the case of a log-linear utility function and ﬁnally relax the restrictive
assumption of absentee landlords, which is not realistic in the context of U.S.
cities, to explore the full-closed city model.
2.1 Brueckner and Kim (2003)
Let us present the model of Brueckner and Kim (2003).
City The city is monocentric, closed and linear2 where the Central Busi-
ness District (CBD hereafter) is located as the origin (zero). All land is own
by absentee landlords.
2In fact, Brueckner and Kim (2003) assume that the city is circular. The linearity
assumption does not aﬀect any of their results.
4Firms (land developers) There is a housing industry with has the fol-
lowing production function:3
Q = H(L,K) (1)
where L and K are respectively land and capital (or nonland input). This
function is increasing and concave in each of its argument. It is assumed that
the housing production function H(L,K) has constant returns to scale, which
implies that the production function can be written as:
h = h(S) (2)
where S ≡ K/L represents the capital per acre of land or improvments per
acre. S is also referred to as the structural density (Brueckner, 1987) and is
an index of the height of buildings. The function h(S) ≡ Q/L deﬁned by (2)
is the housing output per acre of land, with h0(S) > 0 and h00(S) < 0.
When there are no taxes, the proﬁti sg i v e nb y :
Π = RHH(L,K) − RL− rK
or equivalently
π ≡ Π/L = RH h(S) − (R + rS)
where π is the proﬁtp e ra c r eo fl a n d ,RH is the rental price per unit of housing
service q, Ri st h er e n tp e ru n i to fl a n d( l a n dc o s tp e ra c r e )a n dr the price of
capital (or the cost per unit of S).
When θ, the property tax rate, is introduced, each proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm
of the housing industry behaves as:4
max
S
{π = RH h(S) − (1 + θ)(R + rS)} at each x ∈ [0,x f] (3)
Consumers/Workers Each household contains one person. Each indi-
vidual chooses z and q that maximize their utility function under their budget
constraint, i.e.
max
z,q U(z,q) s.t. z + RH q = y − tx (4)
3Observe that the housing capital K is assumed to be perfectly malleable. This strongly
simpliﬁes the analysis since it implies that producers are able to costlessly adjust both their
capital and land inputs, and, as a result, the issue of durability of structures is not analyzed
here.
4Observe that it does not matter whether the developer or the urban resident pays the
property tax θ. The same results would emerge if the residents pay at a rate θ,s ot h a t
the gross-of-tax rent price is written RH(1 + θ). Then, the developer proﬁtw i l lj u s tb e
RHh(S) − (R + rS),w i t hn ot a xt e r ms h o w i n gu p .
5where x is the distance to the CBD, z and q are, respectively, the consump-
tion of the composite good (which price is taken as the numeraire) and the
lot size (or dwelling size), y, the common income, and t the pecuniary com-
muting cost per unit of distance. It is assumed that U(z.q) is well-behaved,
i.e. it is increasing and strictly concave in each of its argument and smooth
(diﬀerentiable). The program (4) is equivalent to
max












Equation (5) implicitly deﬁnes q = q(x,y). Using the budget constraint,we
obtain
z(x,y)=y − tx− RH(x)q(x,y)
Plugging these two values into the utility function gives the following indirect
utility function:
U((y − tx− RH(x)q(x,y),q(x,y)) ≡ u (6)
where u is the common utility level reached in equilibrium by all residents in
the city. Finally, by taking the inverse of this function, we can determine the
bid rent of all individuals as
RH = RH(x,u)







Plugging this value RH(x,u) in q = q(x,y), which using (5) deﬁnes q = q(x,u)











5The second order condition is given by
UzzR2
H + Uqq − 2RHUzq
and is assumed to be negative. A suﬃcient condition is that Uzq > 0.
6Equilibrium Plugging (6) in (3), the land developer’s program becomes
max
S
{π = RH(x,u)h(S) − (1 + θ)[R(x)+rS]} at each x ∈ [0,x f]




























We can now deﬁne the population density as D ≡ h[S(x,u,θ)]/q(x,u),
which is the ratio between square feet of ﬂoor space per acre of land and square
feet of ﬂoor space per dwelling (person). This is a diﬀerent concept than the
structural density or improvments deﬁned by S(x,u,θ). The two concepts are
important to understand the main results of Brueckner and Kim (2003). As
noted above, the improvments (i.e. the intensity of land development) are
am e a s u r eo fb u i l d i n gh e i g h ts oah i g h e rS means that developers construct
higher buildings, containing more housing ﬂo o rs p a c ep e ra c r eo fl a n d .O nt h e
other hand, a higher population density means that either the housing ﬂoor
space is higher or the dwelling size is lower.
Let us now go back to the analysis. Since H(.) has constant returns to
scale, in equilibrium, the housing industry is such that all ﬁrms make zero
proﬁta te a c hx,t h a ti s





h[S(x,u,θ)] − rS(x,u,θ) (9)
























2 < 0 (10)
We can now formally deﬁne the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An urban land-use equilibrium in a linear and closed city with






dx = N (12)







where R(xf,u,θ), S (x,u,θ), q(x,u) are deﬁned by (9), (8), and (7), respec-
tively.
Equation (11) says that the bid rent of the individuals must be equal to
the agricultural land at the city fringe. Equations (12) gives the population
constraint. Finally, equation (13) deﬁnes the equilibrium land rent as the
upper envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers’ types and the
agricultural rent line.
The main result of Brueckner and Kim (2003) can be summarized as follows:




However, for CES preferences,7 if the elasticity of substitution σ ≥ 1,t h e n
∂xf/∂θ < 0,w h i l ei fσ<1,t h es i g no f∂xf/∂θ is still ambiguous.
By remembering our discussion about structural versus population density,
the intuition of this result is easy to understand. There are two countervailing
eﬀects of an increase of a property tax θ on urban sprawl xf.O n t h e o n e
hand, an increase in θ has a direct negative eﬀect on the proﬁt of developers,
which accordingly reduce the level of improvements (or structural density).
As a result, for a given size of dwellings, buildings are shorter and thus the
population density is lower. Because population is ﬁxed (closed city), it has




αz−β +( 1− α)q−β¤−1/β
where −1 ≤ β<+∞ and with σ =1 /(1 + β) giving the elasticity of substitution, where
0 ≤ σ<+∞.
8eﬀect). On the other hand, an increase in θ has an indirect negative eﬀect on
households’ housing consumption because the tax on land and improvments
is partly shifted forward to consumers, which yields a higher price of housing
and thus a lower dwelling size. Since smaller dwellings imply an increase
in population density D and thus more urban sprawl (this is referred to as
the dwelling size eﬀect). The net eﬀect is thus ambiguous in the general
case. In the CES case, when the consumptions of z (composite good) and
q (housing) are highly substituable (σ ≥ 1), the dwelling-size eﬀect becomes
more important and the net eﬀect is such that an increase in θ decreases urban
sprawl.
2.2 A new speciﬁcc a s e
We would like now to go further and, for that, we need to make some assump-
tions. We will use a log-linear utility function (quasi-linear preferences), which
has nice properties, especially in urban economics (see Zenou, 2005).
Consumers/Workers We assume the following utility function
U(z,q)=z +l o gq (14)





z(x,y)=y − t.x − 1 (16)
The indirect utility function can thus be written as:
u = y − t.x − 1 − logRH(x) (17)
and the bid rent function is given by:




= −texp(y − t.x − 1 − u) < 0
∂RH(x,u)
∂u
= −exp(y − t.x − 1 − u) < 0
Plugging this value RH(x,u) in q = q(x) gives ﬁnally
q(x,u)=
1
exp(y − t.x − 1 − u)
(19)
It is important to observe that, even though the housing consumption q is not
directly aﬀected by income y (see (15)),8 it is indirectly aﬀected by income
8This is because of the log-linear nature of the utility function, which is deﬁned in (14).
9through the land rent (see (19)). Indeed, when income increases, the bid rent
increases (see (18)) since people are richer. As a result, because housing is more





[exp(y − t.x − 1 − u)]
2 < 0
We also easily obtain:
∂q(x,u)
∂x
= texp[1 + u + t.x − y)] > 0
∂q(x,u)
∂u
=e x p [ 1 + u + t.x − y)] > 0
Equilibrium Plugging (6) in (3), the land developer’s program becomes:
max
S
{π = RH(x,u)h(S) − (1 + θ)[R(x)+rS]} at each x ∈ [0,x f]





0(S)=( 1+θ)rexp(t.x +1+u − y)
and gives
S(x,u,θ)=h
0−1 [(1 + θ)rexp(t.x +1+u − y)]


























exp(y − t.x − 1 − u)
(1 + θ)r
9Formulation (20) implies that the housing industry has the a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which is deﬁned as follows:
Q = H(K,L)=2 K1/2L1/2

















exp(y − t.x − 1 − u)2
[(1 + θ)r]
3 < 0
Since H(.) has constant returns to scale, in equilibrium, the housing indus-





In our case, we have
R(x,u,θ)=



























L e tu su s et h ed e ﬁnition 1 of the equilibrium. Solving the ﬁrst equation (11)
yields
t.xf = y − 1 − u − log(1 + θ) − log
p
rRA
and the second equation (12) leads to
t.xf = y − 1 − u −
1
2
log{exp[2(y − 1 − u)] − (1 + θ)rtN}














∗ = y − 1 −
1
2
log{(1 + θ)r[(1 + θ)RA + tN]} (22)
11Proposition 2 Assume that the city is closed and the landlords are absent.
Then, if the utility function is quasi-linear and deﬁn e da si n( 1 4 )a n dt h e




















The following comments are in order. First, an increase in the property tax
unambiguously decreases both urban sprawl and utility. This is because our
utility function is not a special case of the CES utility function proposed by
Brueckner and Kim (2003) since in their model the elasticity of substitution
σ =1 /(1+β) is a constant that depends only on the parameter β whereas here
it is given by: σ =1+1 /z, which, in equilibrium and using (16) is equal to:
σ =1+1 /(y − t.x − 1), and thus depend on distance to jobs. Of course, in
our case, σ>1, which explains why ∂xf/∂θ < 0. Second, we have a new result
here that was not present in Brueckner and Kim (2003), which is interesting
and may be tested empirically. Indeed, we are able to derive some cross-eﬀect
results: the higher the commuting cost and the smaller the city (in terms of
population), the higher the negative eﬀect of the property tax on urban sprawl.
This shows, for example, that in bigger cities the eﬀect of property taxes on
urban sprawl is lower than in small cities.
2.3 The case when landlords are not absent: The fully
closed city
We would like now to go further by extending this model. In most cities in the
world landlords are not absent and thus we would like to relax the assumption
of absentee landlords. In the fulled closed city, which is discussed here, urban
land is rented from absentee landlords at a price equaling the agricultural rent
(for a standard analysis of a fulled closed city, see Pines and Sadka, 1986, and
Fujita, 1989, ch. 3).10
To be more precise, the city residents are now assumed to form a govern-
ment, which rents the land for the city from rural landlords at agricultural
10As noted by Brueckner and Kim (2003), one could even go further by also including
in the income of urban residents the revenue from housing capital. We do not pursue this
avenue here because we believe that it is reasonable to assume that housing capital accrues
to absentee owners while for land rents it is more to diﬃcult to accept this assumption.
12rent RA. The city government, in turn, subleases the land to city residents at
the competitive rent R(x) ≡ R(x,u,θ) at each location x.W ec a nd e ﬁne the









The income of each individual is now given by y+TDR/N.11 As a result, the
program of each individual is now given by:
max













Everything is now the same, the only diﬀerence is to replace y by y+TDR/N.
This complicates the analysis because TDR is endogenous and depends on u



































Lemma 1 We have
∂R(x,u,θ)
∂x





Q 0 ⇔ xf Q
N
2R(x,u,θ)
11Observe that, as noted above, the utility function (14) implies that the dwelling size q
does not directly but indirectly depend on income y through bid rent. So, the fully closed
city model is relevant here since an increase in the property tax θ aﬀects the TDRand thus
the income of urban residents, which in turn aﬀects their housing consumption.
13∂R(x,u,θ)
∂θ
Q 0 ⇔ xf Q
N
2R(x,u,θ)
In particular, if xf < N




∂u < 0 and
∂R(x,u,θ)
∂θ < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We can now write the equilibrium conditions (11) and (12). The ﬁrst one
is:
R(xf,u,θ)=RA












− t.xf − 1 − u
¶¸2
= RA (1 + θ)
2 r











R(x,u,θ)dx = y−1−u−log(1 + θ)−log
p
rRA (25)






which is given by
Z xf
0
[exp2(y + TDR/N− t.x − 1 − u)]dx =
(1 + θ)rN
2

































Proposition 3 Assume that the city is closed and the landlords are the city
residents (the full closed city case). Then, if the utility function is quasi-linear








14Proof. See the Appendix.
In the fully closed city model, increasing property taxes does reduce the
city size and thus urban sprawl. This shows that this last result is robust,
even when there are general equilibrium eﬀects since, contrary to the absentee
landlords’ case, here the rent generated by the land appears as income for
the urban residents. Indeed, because urban resident are here landowners and
because the latter bear a signiﬁcant portion of the property tax burden, the
building height eﬀect mentioned earlier is stronger and thus the reduction in
dwelling size outweights the decrease in building height. The net eﬀect of
increasing a property tax thus unambiguously reduces the size of the city. We
thus believe that, as soon as q and S are endogenous (and they should be),
this negative eﬀect of θ on urban sprawl is quite strong. It is obtained in the
context of a quasi-linear utility function (Proposition 3) for a fully closed city
and in the case of a CES utility function for a closed city when the elasticity of
substitution is large enough (Proposition 1).12 It has to be observed that in the
extreme case of Leontief preferences where σ =0 ,a n dr e s o r t i n gt on u m e r i c a l
simulations only, Brueckner and Kim (2003) show that an increase in θ may
increase city size. This is not very convincing because, in the real-world, we
do believe that households do substitute non-spatial good consumption with
housing consumptions. Also no formal theoretical result has been obained.
The next section, which deals with the test of this model, will shed light on
this issue.
3 Data and empirical analysis
3.1 Developing a national sample of eﬀective tax rates
We would like now to test the main result of propositions 2 and 3, i.e. the fact
that increasing property taxes reduces urban sprawl. For that, we choose the
“urbanized area” as our unit of analysis. Urbanized areas are deﬁned generally
as cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants and their surrounding densely settled
urban fringe, whether or not incorporated.13
We take the following approach to measure an eﬀective tax rate for each
12Arnott and MacKinnon (1977) ﬁn dt h es a m er e s u l t .
13Urbanized areas diﬀer in concept from metropolitan areas. In general, metropolitan
areas are deﬁned as cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants, their counties, and surrounding
counties that have a high degree of social and economic integration with the core. Metropol-
itan areas thus include urban population not contiguous to the core as well as rural popula-
tion. Thus, as suggested by Brueckner and Kim (2003), the urbanized area corresponds to
the requirements of the theory in a better way than other census-deﬁned units.
15urbanized area. We ﬁrst collect eﬀective tax rates imposed by diﬀerent level of
taxing jurisdictions — counties, cities, townships, and school districts. These
data are collected from the Department of Taxation from various states, Asso-
ciation of County Commissioners, and local governmental units. Many states
conduct the tax rate survey to collect eﬀective tax rates from various localities
a n dh a v em a d ee ﬀe c t i v et a xr a t e sa v a i l a b l ea tw e b s i t e s . 14
One of main purposes of collecting tax rates by the state is to oﬀer a
common standard for the comparison of tax rates among taxing jurisdictions.
Therefore those rates are comparable across areas. Usually, the eﬀective tax
rates are obtained by adjusting the nominal tax rate with the sales/assessment
ratio, which is estimated and determined by the state agencies. For those states
without available information from websites, we obtained data on tax rates by
contacting local government units to obtain data on eﬀective rates imposed by
the counties, cities, townships, and school districts. We do not collect eﬀective
tax rates from special districts such as ﬁre, water, sewer, etc. as those tax
rates are generally not reported by the state agencies. Since special districts
are formed to provide services to the inhabitants of a limited area, we argue
that the omission of including tax rates from special districts would not have
as i g n i ﬁcant impact on the result of this study.
We then construct the aggregated eﬀective tax rate for an urbanized area.
Speciﬁcally, we employ spatial analysis techniques by using GIS. We ﬁrst obtain
data on GIS boundaries of various taxing jurisdictions such as counties, cities,
townships, and school districts.15 Using our collected eﬀective tax rates from
these various taxing localities, we then create a weighted average of tax rate for
the urbanized area by combining input data from various jurisdictions based on
spatial correspondence and association between these layers. For illustration
of our approach, Figure 1 presents various boundaries of taxing districts for
a hypothetical urbanized area, where it is assumed for simplicity that this
urbanized area can be divided into ﬁve parts: P1 with eﬀective tax rates (T1)
from county 1 and school district 1; P2 with eﬀective tax rates (T2)f r o m
county 1, city 1 and school district 2; P3 with eﬀective tax rates (T3)f r o m
county 2 and school district 3; P4 with eﬀective tax rates (T4)f r o mc o u n t y2 ,
city 2 and school district 4; and P5 with eﬀective tax rates (T5)f r o mc o u n t y
2 and school district 4. Then the weighted average of the eﬀective tax rate for




15These data are available from U.S. Census, or can be purchased from GeoCommunity
(a GIS data depot).
















In reality it is more complicated than this scenario since a county or a city
can both have multiple school districts or a same school district might belong
to diﬀerent cities. Using GIS overlaying techniques allows us to cope with
these complexities.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We excluded urbanized areas with a population size larger than ﬁve million.
Our ﬁnal sample includes 448 observations. The distribution of eﬀective tax
rates by urbanized areas is shown in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
3.2 Empirical strategy and data
An empirical test based on the above theoretical analysis is extremely useful
to facilitate the debate on the relationship with property tax and urban devel-
opment. The analytical framework is presented graphically in Figure 2. The
ﬁgure enumerates various interplaying factors in a regional land market that
aﬀect city size and urban density.
The ﬁgure includes, on its left side, a number of exogenous variables such
as population, income, agricultural rent and commuting cost that aﬀect spatial
growth of cities. Our theoretical model of section 2, provides a clear expla-
nation of the spatial growth of cities. Given the conﬂuence of an expanding
population, rising incomes, and falling commuting costs, it is not surprising
that most U.S. cities have expanded rapidly in recent decades. Brueckner and
Fansler (1983)’s study tested the validity of this set of exogenous variables.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The ﬁgure then includes property tax, the main interest of this study.
We show that households (who are also landlords) and developers respond to
various inﬂuences identiﬁed in the framework via the regional land market,
and this in turn determines spatial city size.
We then perform a regression analysis to examine the eﬀect of property tax
on spatial sizes of cities. This analysis allows us to isolate the eﬀects of property
tax on city size while controlling for other factors. Speciﬁcally, dependent and
17independent variables and associated measurements are summarized in Table
1. Summary statistics of these variables are presented in Table 2.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
The dependent variable, the size of urbanized areas, is derived from re-
trieving data from the U.S. Census and is measured by the spatial size of the
urbanized area in acres in 2000.
The independent variables are derived from retrieving data from the U.S.
Census, survey, and secondary data sources and the list includes the following:
• Population: Population is measured by 2000 urbanized area population;
• Income: Income is represented by a measure of average household in-
come, standardized by housing costs across urbanized areas in the U.S.
• Agricultural Rent: Agricultural rent is measured by the 1999 median
agricultural land value per acre for the county containing the urbanized area;
• Commuting Cost:16 Transportation expenditure by government per
capita in the urbanized area is used. Higher the expenditure indicates lower
commuting costs.
• Property Tax: As mentioned above, we employ overlay techniques in
GIS and create a weighted average tax rate for each urbanized area in 1997.
The challenge in estimating a causal impact of property tax on city size is to
overcome simultaneity bias. As shown by the theoretical model, high property
tax might lead to two countervailing eﬀects, which, in ﬁne, will reduce the
size of cities. On the other hand, ineﬃciently expanded cities might increase
property tax rates to raise local revenues to provide infrastructures. To address
this endogeneity problem, we perform a Hausman endogeneity test. We ﬁnd
that the diﬀerences between the IV estimates and OLS estimates are large
enough to suggest that the OLS estimates are inconsistent. We then test to
see if the reason for the inconsistent estimates is due to the endogeneity of
property tax rate. We found that the Hausman statistics is 62.52 (chi-square)
and is signiﬁcant at the 0.000 level. The small p−value indicates that there
is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the IV and OLS coeﬃcients, and the OLS
is not consistent. We therefore adopt an instrumental variables approach in
16Brueckner and Fansler (1983) used two proxies for commuting cost: percentage of com-
muters using transit and percentage of households owning one or more automobiles. However
Brueckner and Fansler pointed out these two proxies performed poorly in their model exam-
ining the economics of urban sprawl. We explored percentage of commuters using transit,
percentage of households owning one or more automobiles, and road density (measured by
street miles per square mile) as proxies for commuting cost. Even though these proxies are
not signiﬁcant in the regression, our main result (i.e. the eﬀect of property tax on city size)
is not altered when using these proxies.
18which an instrument is used to predict the property tax θi, which is treated as
an endogenous variable.
To be more precise, to identify the impact of property tax on city size
using instrumental variables, we need an instrument that predicts changes in
property tax rates, but is unrelated to changes in city size (after controlling for
other relevant factors). An appropriate instrument for the property tax rate
is the magnitude of state aid to schools. In Illinois, for example, state aid to
schools is low compared to most other states, which means that property taxes
are relatively high in Illinois. Data on state aid to schools are available from the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). In this context, the impact
of property tax on city size is estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS),
treating the property tax variable as endogenous and the other right-hand-side
v a r i a b l e sa se x o g e n o u s . T h eﬁrst stage of the 2SLS regression indicates that
the instrument chosen is appropriate since it shows that the relation between
property tax and the magnitude of state aid to local governments is signiﬁcant.
In the second stage, we insert the predicted values into the city-size equation.
In particular, we estimate the following:
θi,t = αiXi,t+3 + δZi,t+3 + ηi
UAi,t+3 = βiXi,t+3 + γθi,t + εi
where i indexes the relevant spatial unit (the urbanized area for example) and
t =1 9 9 7 , UAi,t+3 i st h es i z eo ft h es p a t i a lu n i ti at time t +3=2 0 0 0 , Xi,t+3
is a vector of control variables in unit i at time t +3=2 0 0 0 , Zi,t+3 is the
appropriate instrument in unit i at time t +3=2 0 0 0 ,a n dθi,t denotes the
property tax in i at time t =1 9 9 7 . The error terms εi and ηi are normally
distributed. The instrument Zi,t+3 is correlated with θi,t and is uncorrelated
with εi. Observe that we lag the property tax θ b yt h r e ey e a r sb e c a u s et h e
eﬀect of θ on the size of an urbanized areas is obviously not instantaneous but
t a k e ss o m et i m e .
3.3 Empirical results and discussion
According to our theoretical model (section 2), the key relationship is between
property tax and urban sprawl. As stated above, we run a 2SLS regression.
The ﬁrst stage of the IV procedure amounts to regressing θi,t h ep r o p e r t yt a x
in area i,o nZi, the magnitude of state aid to schools in area i (our instrument).
The results of this ﬁrst stage regression suggest that our instrument Zi has a
strong predictive power since it enters the equation with a coeﬃcient of −0.30
and a t−ratio of 2.738. The negative sign was expected since more state aid to
19schools in an area implies quite naturally lower poperty taxes in this area. Let
us now focus on the second stage. Regression results using OLS and 2SLS with
instruments (IV) are respectively presented in columns two and three of Table
3. When the regression is performed without instruments (OLS), so that the
simultaeous bias between these two variables is not taking care of, the eﬀect
of the property tax on city size is not signiﬁcant, though negative. When the
regression is implemented using the “magnitude of state aid to schools” as an
instrument for the property tax rate, we ﬁnd, on the contrary that an increase
in property tax does reduce the city size in the United States. In terms of
magnitude, a 10 percent increase in property tax reduces on average the city
size and thus the urban sprawl by 730 acres.17
[Insert Table 3 here]
This has important policy implications for the United States. In particular,
if urban sprawl is considered to be “harmful” for the welfare of the society, then
local governments should increase the property tax. Of course, one has to be
extremely precise and careful in the deﬁnition of welfare. In order to address
this issue, two extensions of our theoretical framework can be considered. First,
one has to deﬁne in a precise way what is the welfare of the society. The most
natural way is to take the weighted sum of all agents in the city, here the
workers (who are also landlords) and the ﬁrms. Then one can calculate the
exact loss of welfare when the city expands. Second, and more importantly,
one can determine the optimal city property tax. In our current model, the
property tax rate is exogenous. We thus need to add a new actor, the city-
planner, who will determine the optimal property tax that maximizes the
welfare of the society under a city budget constraint. Because the city-planner
internalizes the externalities of urban sprawl, this model will be also able to
determine the optimal size of the city or equivalently the optimal “sprawl” of
a city. A direct consequence of this analysis is that diﬀerent cities should have
diﬀerent property tax rates and thus diﬀerent optimal urban sizes. This will
enable us to compare the optimal tax given by the model and the one observed
in the real world for each urbanized area and thus say which city has too low
property tax and thus excessive urban expansion. This is important and we
leave it for future research.
17For the other variables, in both regressions, we show quite naturally that larger pop-
ulation size, larger income and lower commuting costs (proxied by larger transportation
investment) are associated with larger urban sizes.
20References
[1] Arnott, R.J. and J.G. MacKinnon (1977), “The eﬀects of the property
tax: A general equilibrium simulation,” Journal of Urban Economics,4 ,
389-407.
[2] Brueckner, J.K. (1987), “The structure of urban equilibria: a uniﬁed treat-
ment of the Muth-Mills model,” in Handbook of Regional and Urban Eco-
nomics, E.S. Mills (Ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 821-845.
[3] Brueckner, J.K. (2000), “Urban sprawl: Diagnosis and remedies,” Inter-
national Regional Science Review, 23, 160-171.
[4] Brueckner, J.K. and D.A. Fansler (1983), “The economics if urban sprawl:
Theory and evidence on the spatial sizes of cities,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 65, 479-482.
[5] Brueckner, J.K and H. Kim (2003), “Urban sprawl and the property tax,”
International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 5-23.
[6] Case, K. E. and J. H. Grant (1991), “Property tax incidence in a multi-
jurisdictional neoclassical model,” Public Finance Quarterly, 19, 379-392.
[7] Fujita, M. (1989), Urban Economic Theory, Cambridge: CambridgeUni-
versity Press.
[8] George, H. (1879), Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of
Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth,
New York: Robert Schalkenbach.
[9] Glaeser, E.L. and M.E. Kahn (2004), “Sprawl and urban growth,” in
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics Vol. 4, J.V. Henderson and
J-F. Thisse (Eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 2498-2527.
[10] Mills, E. S. (1998), “The economic consequences of a land tax,” in Land
Value Taxation: Could it Work Today?, D. Netzer (Ed.), Cambridge, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
[11] Nechyba, T.J. and R. P. Walsh (2004), “Urban sprawl,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 18, 177-200.
[12] Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab (1997), “The impact of urban land tax-
ation: The Pittsburgh experience,” National Tax Journal, 50, 1—21.
21[13] Pines, D. and E. Sadka (1986), “Comparative statics analysis of a fully
closed city,” Journal of Urban Economics, 20, 1-20.
[14] Skaburskis, A. and R. Tomalty (1997), “Land value taxation and develop-
ment activity: The reaction of Toronto and Ottawa developers, planners,
and municipal ﬁnance oﬃcials,” Canadian Journal of Regional Science,
20, 401-417
[15] Zenou, Y. (2005), Urban Labor Economic Theory. Eﬃciency Wages, Job
Search and Urban Ghettos, in progress.
22APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1














































(1 + θ)(2Rxf − N)
Proof of Proposition 3



















































































































































































































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
−Fθ Fu
−Gθ Gu









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Fxf −Fθ
Gxf −Gθ







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Fxf Fu
Gxf Gu
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ = GuFxf − GxfFu > 0.




= sign[−GuFθ + GθFu]

































To show the second result (31), it suﬃces to use (28) and (29).
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P2: T2 (County 1 + City 1 + School district 2) 
P1: T1 (County 1 + School district 1) 





P4: T4 (County 2 + City 2 + School district 4) 










Figure 2. Effective Tax Rates by Urbanized Area 
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Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables and Measurements 
 
Variables  Measurements (Data Source) 
Dependent Variable   
Urbanized Area 
Spatial size of the urbanized area in acres in 2000 (U.S. 
Census). 
  
Independent Variables   
Population   Urbanized area population in 2000 (U.S. Census). 
Income 
Average household income in USD in 2000 standardized 
by housing costs in 2000 (U.S. Census). 
Agricultural Land Rent  
The median agricultural land value per acre in 1999 for the 
county containing the urbanized area (U.S. Census). 
Transportation 
expenditure 
Transportation expenditure by government in USD per 
capita in 2000 (U.S. Census) 
Property Tax 
A weighted average property tax rate for each urbanized 
area (U.S. Census, Web survey, Secondary Data sources 







Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 
     Minimum  Maximum  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Urbanized Area  7,742 1,256,051 90,112 141,797 
Population  49,776 4,918,839 333,239 635,474 
Income 
(Standardized by 
housing costs)  
20,633 79,614 40,466 9,409 
Agricultural Land 
Rent  0 224,006 1,418 10,954 
Transportation 
expenditure  0 45,4177 12,274 38,703 
Property Tax  2.60 28.52 11.35 5.03 
  Sample size: 448 





Table 3. Regression Results 
 
Endogenous variable: Spatial size of the urbanized area in 2000 


























Notes: Absolute values of robust t-statistics are in parentheses.  
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at  5% level 
***significant at 1% level. 
 
                                                            
 
 